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On the Normative Aspects of Globalisation 
Introduction 
Worth addressing in any discussion on globalisation are the possible 
implications for the basic unit of socio-cultural and political change – the person.  
How do changing social structures affect what it means to be a person?  Personhood is 
a central part of the human experience and how we conceive ourselves has 
implications for how we relate with others and perceive our roles in society.  For the 
African this is even more so since a large part of the way he sees himself is socially 
constituted.  As Mbiti says, in African traditional thought, it is not “I think therefore I 
am” but “I am because we are.”1  Further implications of a project of personhood can 
be seen for moral and political thought – how we are to determine what is right to do 
and how we are to order our societies.  We see that at the foundation of philosophical 
thinking is what it means to be a person.  Investigating personhood situates the person 
at the centre of philosophical endeavour.  When we investigate what it means to be a 
person, we are actually engaging in an indirect investigation into all other aspects of 
philosophy.   This is particularly so in the African context where conceptualisation is 
mostly people-based and embedded in the culture of a community.  The person is the 
starting point for philosophical characterisation and so understanding the ways in 
which we conceive persons is central to understanding our worldview as Africans.   
 
This paper discusses the characterisations of Menkiti and Gyekye on the 
relationship between the person and the community in African thought.  This is with 
the aim of uncovering certain tensions and showing how they can be causally linked 
to globalisation.  We investigate to what extent these tensions can be resolved by 
looking at Kant’s ethics and its development by C. Korsgaard.  We then explore the 
possible implications of this for African legal thinking and the vision of a ‘general’ 
jurisprudence that some Western legal philosophers like Twining have proposed.   
 
The paper is structured in five main sections.  Section I deals with a discussion 
of Menkiti’s characterisation of the nature of personhood in African thought and the 
significance of communal obligations in the scheme.  We show how there is a 
paradox in the way he connects the achievement of personhood with the performance 
of rituals and cultural practices.   This paradox cannot be resolved without 
contradictions in his characterisation.  We go on in Section II to discuss Gyekye’s 
critique of Menkiti and his notion of the relationship between the person and the 
community in African culture, implying a moderate communitarianism rather than an 
absolute conception, as can be seen in Menkiti’s characterisation.  We show however 
how this modification of Menkiti’s account, though it appears to resolves some of 
Menkiti’s difficulties, gives rise to problems when conceptualising the boundaries of 
personhood in relation to the community.  We then in Section III take recourse to 
Kantian thought for a possible resolution of these issues and in Section IV discuss 
some significant developments of Kantian thought as proposed Korsgaard and show 
their relevance to our project.  We then in Section V explore the significance of this 
for African legal thinking and the possibility of a general jurisprudence.  We argue 
that the challenge that globalisation presents to legal thinking is not the achievement 
of a general jurisprudence but rather a dialogue of legal cultures proposed here. 
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Menkiti and Communal Obligations 
 
Menkiti presents what we call the traditional view of the relationship between 
the person and the community in African thought.  He argues that there is a difference 
between the conception of the person in Western thought and that in African thought.  
This difference lies in the primacy given to the community over the person.  
According to Menkiti, “…the reality of the communal world takes precedence over 
the individual life histories.”2  For him there exists a communal conception of the 
good and this communal conception is prior to any individual conceptions.  This 
priority of communal conceptions is linked with the notion that persons in African 
societies are defined with reference to the community.  They are not defined by the 
characteristics which are attached to them by virtue of being human beings. 
 
According to Menkiti, whereas in Western conceptions, the existence of 
rationality or any physical feature can mean the existence of a person, to define the 
person in African thought the starting point is the community of which the person is a 
part.3  Persons are perceived and evaluated through the communities they belong to.   
Also, persons perceive themselves in terms of the community.  Thus in addition to 
being perceived by others through the community, they also perceive themselves 
through the community.  For Menkiti, these internal and external perceptions 
constitute persons.  As he puts it, “it is in rootedness in an ongoing human community 
that the individual comes to see himself as a man.”4  When the community sees him 
as a man, he begins to see himself as a man.  The community is therefore necessary 
for the external and internal construction of the person.  This gives rise to a worldview 
that is principally communally defined.  Menkiti regards language as an important 
aspect of the construction and maintenance of this communal worldview.5  In 
speaking a common language a person not only adopts meanings of the community, 
he also shares these meanings with other members of the community.  This is because 
he speaks the language of the community and he shares this language with other 
members of the community.  This gives him a sense of self that cannot be 
distinguished from the ‘communal self’ if there can be said to be one.  On this 
foundation, Menkiti expresses the notion that the community constitutes persons.  
Since persons are defined by the community and not some personal attribute, it 
follows that the community defines them.   
 
However, this seems to be a hasty jump.  The fact that the community plays an 
encompassing role in the lives of its members cannot not mean (without further 
elaboration), that it constitutes persons.  Menkiti seems to clarify this by showing in 
what way he thinks the community constitutes persons.  He calls this the “process of 
incorporation.”6  In this scheme, persons are constituted as they perform the rituals 
that the community prescribes as necessary for the constitution of persons.  These 
rituals can be a series of tests or activities the member must participate in, in order to 
attain personhood.  Without this process of incorporation, members are, according to 
Menkiti, “mere danglers”.7  Since the attainment of personhood is based on the 
fulfilment of the rituals, non-compliance would mean failure to attain personhood.  He 
therefore describes personhood in African thought as “something at which individuals 
could fail.”8  It is an achievement and not presumed to exist merely because the 
person is born.  For Menkiti, the process of incorporation is also used to transform the 
person.9  It moulds him into the communal ideal or at least a communally compatible 
conception.  However, this does not seem to follow from his subsidiary notion that the 
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community constitutes the person.  For if the community constitutes the person it 
cannot at the same time ‘transform’ the person.  This is because transformation means 
that there already exists something to be transformed.   
 
There is a paradox here.  Where the person does not exist prior to the process 
of incorporation, how can it be said that the process transforms him?  Menkiti could 
however be taken to mean that there exists, prior to the process of incorporation, an 
entity which can be called a ‘person-candidate’ and this entity needs to be 
transformed not only into a person but also and more importantly into a communally 
acceptable person.  As we see, in the process of incorporation, the role of the 
community is an active one.  This follows from Menkiti’s main notion of the 
constitutive community.   
 
He describes the role of the community as being that of the “catalyst and 
prescriber of norms.”10  The individual in this scheme is passive and the community is 
active.  The community sets the rules and prescribes the goals to be attained.  It also 
sets the parameters for persons.  In this way, it plays a regulatory and governing role 
over persons.  It is taken to have ontological priority over persons.  This position of 
ontological priority makes its influence deep and wide-ranging, so that the starting 
point for the normative definition of persons must begin from the community and not 
from persons.  It is what is left from a description of the significance of the 
community that then comprises the individual.   
 
What sort of conception can such a person who is derived from this 
description of the community then have?  A passive one!  Passivity would mean 
reflective ratification of the values and norms of the community.  Since reflection is 
present even in the person who is communally defined, it must have a role.  It cannot 
be dormant, even though it would seem to be so.  Its role would be to recognise the 
authority of the community and accept its requirements as binding on him.  The role 
of reflection does not and cannot extend to choice and reflective rejection.11  This 
would be incompatible with the description of the community and its significance for 
the person.  However, even in its passive sense, the role of reflection here is necessary 
for the success of the description of the community.  Agent-recognition must exist to 
give rise to the authority of the community.  Where persons do not recognise the 
authority of the community and accept its requirements as binding, the community 
cannot exist as described by Menkiti.  Persons need to accord the community such an 
important place in their lives.  We do not think that Menkiti will dispute the need for 
agent-recognition for his description of the community. 
 
However, if agent-recognition is needed for the success of Menkiti’s 
description, then the person seems prior to the community.  In other words, to the 
extent that reflective ratification is necessary for the authority of the community, the 
argument for the ontological primacy of the community over the person hangs by a 
thin thread.  The thread being that if the agent does not recognise and accept the 
community the whole description fails.   Thus, even in its passive form of mere 
recognition and ratification, the role of reflection contradicts the presumed 
overreaching influence of the community.  The community cannot be that powerful if 
persons have to recognise and accept it to give it its normative force. 
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The process of incorporation has other implications.  As Menkiti notes, 
children and animals cannot have rights because they cannot be persons in African 
thought.12  Children by virtue of their age are only at the beginning of the process and 
therefore cannot have achieved full personhood.  Also, animals by their nature cannot 
at whatever age, perform the rituals of personhood.  This means that, in his 
representation of African thought on the normative conception of the person, children 
and animals cannot have rights since rights can only be attached to persons. 
 
However, the tension here is that a strict understanding of Menkiti’s 
characterisation of what he refers to as the “processual nature of being” would mean 
that only old people who have completed the rites of passage into personhood would 
have rights.   It is worth noting that Menkiti’s formulation makes good provision and 
philosophical foundation for the rights of older people.  However, with the absence of 
similar rights for younger individuals, it would be a surprise how many would survive 
long enough to enjoy these rights.  For instance, where the right to life has a 
problematic philosophical foundation because of the implication of the processual 
conception of personhood, any one would feel at liberty to take the life of the person-
candidate.  It would not be morally wrong because what you are killing is not a person 
anyway.  However, Menkiti could mean that different sorts of rights would be 
attached to person-candidates at various points of the process.  He however does not 
clarify this in his characterisation.  But it is clear that whether or not person-
candidates at various points of the process have rights, children who because of their 
age have not yet begun the process, are not considered by him to be persons yet and 
therefore can be taken not to even have the right to life.   
 
This implication though grave is not our main concern.  Another implication is 
of more concern us.  Our aim is to investigate the status of individual rights in African 
philosophical thought.  The major notion of Menkiti’s formulation is that the 
community has ontological priority over persons.  The subsidiary notion he derives 
from this is that the community constitutes the person.  This constitution is comprised 
by the continual participation in as he says, “communal life through the discharge of 
the various obligations defined by one’s stations.”13  Therefore, the performance of 
the rituals and obligations, (though a subsidiary notion derived from the main notion 
of the primacy of the community), is a very important and defining aspect of the main 
notion.  The way that the community ensures and asserts its primacy is through the 
agent’s compliance with the rituals.  The community continues to exist through the 
compliance of its members with its requirements.14   
 
The two notions are drawn from each other and depend on the other.  As 
agent-recognition shows us, where persons do not comply with the requirements of 
the community, they do not only fail as Menkiti says to constitute themselves, they 
also fail to constitute the community.  In complying with the requirements, they are 
recognising the authority of the community.  The community lives on through its 
members.  Duties can therefore be seen as necessary for the survival of this 
conception of the community and Menkiti concedes this when he says that “African 
societies tend to be organized around the requirements of duty ...”15  Since duties and 
the performance of these duties are fundamental to the survival of the community, it 
tries to preserve them and ensure that members perform them.  What is important 
however is the relationship between individual rights and communal duties.  It is 
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worth noting how Menkiti addresses this.  He does not leave us in much doubt in 
relation to this.  He says, 
 
… priority is given to duties which individuals owe to the collectivity, and 
their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their exercise of 
their duties.16 
 
As we see, for Menkiti, communal duties are prior to individual rights.  The primacy 
and importance of the continued existence of the community supersedes all other 
considerations including the welfare of members.  Members are expected to consider 
the welfare of the community before their own.  We see that the status of rights in 
African thought according to Menkiti’s formulation is that they are secondary to 
duties owed to the community.  It can be said that for him, individual rights only exist 
to the extent that they do not conflict with communal duties.  With the overarching 
nature of the community the rights of persons are not given adequate normative space 
to flourish.  In the next section we are going to discuss Gyekye’s response to Menkiti 
and to what extent he adequately addresses this problem.   
 
Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism 
 
Gyekye presents what we call the modern view of the nature of the 
relationship between the person and the community in African thought.  He is aware 
of the traditional view and intends to modify it.  He is of the view that, 
 
Menkiti’s views on the metaphysical status of the community vis-à-vis that of 
the person and his account of personhood in  African moral, social and 
political philosophy are, in my opinion, overstated and not entirely correct, 
and require some amendments or refinements.17 
 
The refinement referred to is in the area of the conception of the persons that form the 
community.  He seems, unlike Menkiti, to place emphasis on the value of the person 
rather than on the community.  He argues that the social structure should be 
conducive to the realisation of the goals of individuals.18  The community is made up 
of persons and they constitute what is seen as the community.   Persons give the 
community its life and form.  They therefore occupy an important status.  According 
to Gyekye, “just as we would not speak of a forest where there is only one tree, so we 
would not – cannot – speak of a community where there is only one person.”19  Every 
community is made up of persons and these persons are necessary for its continued 
existence.  Gyekye argues that although the importance of the community cannot be 
denied, the person still has a very significant place in the scheme of things.   He says:  
 
Failure to recognise this may result in pushing the significance and 
implications of a person’s communal nature beyond their limits, an act that 
would in turn result in investing the community with an all-engulfing moral 
authority to determine all things about the life of the individual person.20 
 
Where normative emphasis is placed on the role of the community, the place of 
individual rights seems non-existent.  For Menkiti, the community has ontological 
priority and constitutes persons.  This constitution is effected by the continual 
participation of members in the rituals of the community.  It is a practical constitution 
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because each stage of personhood is tied to the performance of the rituals in the 
process of incorporation.  This practical constitution gives rise to the distinction 
between persons and person-candidates.   
 
However, as we see, Gyekye does not agree with Menkiti.  Personhood is not 
socially constructed.  It is something that pre-exists the social structure.  According to 
him, “a human person is a person whatever his age or social status.”21  He argues that 
social status is something that a person acquires and the object of acquisition cannot 
constitute the subject of acquisition.22  The exercise of acquisition shows that persons 
pre-exist it.  In other words, you cannot become a person after haven acquired 
something that you need to be a person in order to acquire.  This acquisition also 
implies that the subject has the moral capacity to commence, continue and complete 
the process.  By virtue of being persons we have what Gyekye calls, a “moral 
sense”.23  He says,  
 
… the human person is considered to possess an innate capacity for virtue, for 
performing morally right actions and therefore should be treated as a morally 
responsible agent.24 
 
Moral sense is a capacity for virtue possessed by persons.  It makes us capable of 
reflecting and deciding what we ought or ought not to do.  However, Gyekye does not 
explain the origin and form of this moral sense.  This is because if the source of the 
moral sense is the community and its content, in terms of what it perceives as good or 
evil, mirrors the communal conception, his argument against the constitutive 
community becomes weak.   
 
He appears to solve this problem by offering an account of the nature of the 
role of reflection in the moral agent.  We saw that the use of reflection in Menkiti’s 
scheme is passive because it only recognises the authority of the community and 
accepts its requirements as binding.   However, Gyekye seems to suggest a more 
active role for reflection.  Although this is a subsidiary notion that flows from 
Gyekye’s general emphasis on the value of persons, it is a very important and 
defining one.  He argues that reflection can be used to reject communal duties that are 
not acceptable.  According to him,  
 
… individual persons … may find that aspects of … cultural  givens are 
inelegant, undignifying or unenlightening and can thoughtfully be questioned 
and evaluated. 
  
The evaluation may result in the individual’s affirming or amending or 
refining existing communal goals, values and practices; but it may or could 
also result in the individual’s total rejection of them.25 
  
Our inquiry as to the content and origin of the moral sense seems answered.  
This is because if the agent can reject certain communal duties, then it means that his 
moral conceptions are separate from that of the community.  This difference means 
that the community cannot be the source of the moral sense.  Therefore, the role that 
Gyekye gives reflection is the distinguishing factor in his scheme.  An active use of 
reflection entails also an authoritative use of reflection.  This is because while the 
passive use of reflection endorses the external source as the moral authority for the 
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action, the active use of reflection endorses the agent as the moral authority for the 
action.  This source is external because it entails heteronomous relations to the will.26  
Where reflection is used merely to ratify, the agent is not established as the cause of 
the action.  It rather establishes the external entity as the cause and this means that the 
agent is not acting autonomously.  It is autonomy that gives rise to the assertive use of 
reflection.  As Gyekye says, “the capacity of self-assertion which the individual can 
exercise presupposes, and in fact derives from, the autonomous nature of the 
person.”27  He relies on autonomy to ground his active use of reflection.   
 
This is in line with his argument that personhood is not, as Menkiti says, 
achieved by the participation of the agent in the rituals and practices of the 
community.  He already exists as a person and this means that he can reflect and use 
reflection authoritatively.  Rationality is a constitutive attribute of the person.  Thus, 
because he is a person, he can reflect actively and because he can reflect actively he is 
already a person.  He is not therefore constituted or indeed ‘constitute-able’ by the 
community.  He is autonomous.  He stands on his own normatively.  He constitutes 
himself.   
 
Autonomy and the active use of reflection mean that the agent can, as Gyekye 
says, distance himself from communal values and question them.28  For him, this 
“distancing” is not always a bad thing.  Indeed it is this ability to distance oneself that 
fosters growth and development in the community.  This is because it makes for the 
revision and amendment of its values and practices.  According to Gyekye, 
 
The fact of the changes that do occur in the existing communal values – for 
some new values are evolved as some of the pristine ones fall into 
obsolescence – this fact is undoubtedly the result of the evaluative activities 
and choices of some autonomous, self-assertive individual person.29 
 
Where persons are autonomous and free, the active use of reflection imports 
dynamism into the communal value system.  As persons revise rules and practices, 
new norms are created to replace old ones.  This continual development means that 
individuals can grow alongside the community.  Thus, for Gyekye the notion of 
autonomy in the relationship between the person and the community in African 
thought is not a bad word.  Indeed it might not seem too much like a paradox to say 
that the success of the community depends on the autonomy of its members.   
 
Thus, though for Menkiti, the role of the community is one of “catalyst and 
prescriber of norms”30, for Gyekye it is a nurturer.31  Its role is to provide the enabling 
environment for individual development and in doing this, continue its own existence.   
In doing this, it plays a passive and not an active role with relation to normativity.  
Since autonomy means that the agent can reject certain communal duties that he does 
not find agreeable, it is inconsistent with Menkiti’s description of the community.  As 
we saw, Menkiti’s description affirms the ontological priority of the community over 
the person and what this means for the relationship between rights and duties is that 
individual rights are secondary to communal duties.  Menkiti’s description of the 
community is clearly in line with his characterisation of the relationship between 
rights and duties.  However, in Gyekye’s characterisation it is not as clear.  He argues 
that in addition to being autonomous persons are also “relational.”32  This relationality 
means that they cannot exist on their own.  According to him, 
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It is the necessary relationships which complete the being of the individual 
person who, prior to entering into these relationships, would not be self-
complete for, as we are reminded by an Akan maxim, a person is not a palm 
tree that he should be self-complete or self-sufficient.33 
 
Persons are not expected to survive in isolation from other people.  We have 
what Gyekye calls a “natural sociality”.34  This is an attribute of the human person 
that enables him to flourish and function effectively.  Since human beings are 
naturally social, they need the community to express this aspect of themselves and it 
is only in doing so that they are able to live flourishing lives.35  Gyekye then argues 
further that because of the implications of natural sociality, some of our goals have to 
be set by the community.  His argument can be simply put as follows: because of 
natural sociality, we cannot do without the society and because we cannot do without 
the society, it must set some of our goals. 
 
However, the first and second parts of the argument do not necessarily lead to 
the third.  Human beings are social beings and must live in societies, but that fact does 
not further imply that they must be morally dependent on those societies.  Moral 
autonomy is not inconsistent with natural sociality.  It is true that no one can live in 
isolation and physical autonomy may be impossible but it is not physical autonomy 
that is at issue so the palm tree proverb is not a very good analogy.  It only shows that 
the physical autonomy that is possible for plants may not be similarly possible for 
human beings.  It gives no answers with relation to moral autonomy.  It does not 
follow from the fact that human beings must live in societies that the society must set 
all or any of their goals.  Indeed persons can and do live in societies and still set their 
own goals.  Because they have the capacity to distance themselves from communal 
values, they can set their own goals. 
 
Also, Gyekye’s argument on natural sociality gives rise to a “partial 
autonomy”, which is not compatible with his description of the person.  He argues 
that by autonomy he does not mean self-completeness.36  However, autonomy does 
not mean self-completeness.  Autonomy and self-completeness are intrinsically 
distinct concepts even though they may look alike.  Self-completeness is an empty 
and ambiguous term.  It can be used to mean that the person does not need any other 
person but himself to exist.  In this sense, self-completeness is not impossible.  The 
argument on natural sociality should give an account of the continued existence of 
persons who wilfully remove themselves from association with other persons.  Moral 
autonomy is however different from this wilful removal.   
 
Autonomy, for Kant, means the freedom to be ruled by oneself.37  It is not a 
lawless or a physically isolative freedom.  It is a freedom in relation to moral action 
and not physical presence.  Kant does not stop at defining autonomy as freedom.  He 
argues that there is a need to prescribe the law with which the autonomous person 
rules himself.  The import of this law is the defining factor for Kant’s form of 
autonomy.  With the application of this law, autonomy cannot mean selfishness or 
self-completeness.  Autonomy can then mean altruism and even natural sociality.   
The law is as follows: act only according to the maxim that you can will as a universal 
law.  This means that if the act cannot be willed as a universal law, it is not something 
that the autonomous person should do.  In willing an act as a universal law, the agent 
acts in consideration not only of himself but also of the world around him.  The act 
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must be something that can be universally willed without destroying itself or the 
normative order of which it is a part.  In trying to will an act as a universal maxim, the 
agent cannot act from a selfish motive.  The formula requires him to act universally.   
This means that autonomy cannot mean acting in isolation because the formula of 
universal law compels the autonomous person to act universally. 
 
Gyekye argues that the community sets some of the goals of persons and so 
partly constitutes persons.38  This entails a partial autonomy.  However, Kant’s 
description of autonomy also means that there cannot be partial autonomy.  This is 
because a person cannot be autonomous and act heteronomously.  Though he may 
reflectively endorse some communal values this does not mean that he is acting 
heteronomously.  This is because in reflectively endorsing certain values he is acting 
autonomously in relation to those values.  Reflective endorsement is therefore 
different from reflective ratification.  In reflective ratification, the person uncritically 
adopts the communal values.  However, in reflective endorsement the person 
critically adopts the values and makes them his own.  His autonomy is therefore not 
threatened by the reflective endorsement of communal values.  Reflective 
endorsement does not mean that the community constitutes persons.  In endorsing, 
they make the values their own and wholly constitute themselves.  Reflective 
endorsement is therefore useful to diffuse the tension in relation to the conception of 
the person in Gyekye’s formulation.  However, another tension lies within his account 
of the relationship between individual rights and communal duties.  As we have seen, 
Gyekye emphasizes the importance of the autonomy of persons in the community and 
gives reflection an active role.  However, this is not consistent with his account of the 
relationship between individual rights and communal duties.  According to him, 
 
However, in the light of the overwhelming emphasis on duties within the 
communitarian moral framework, rights would not be given priority over the 
values of duty and so would not be in-violable or indefeasible: if might on this 
showing, be appropriate occasionally to override some individual rights for the 
sake of protecting the good of the community itself.39 
 
Individuals would not have a penchant for, an obsession with insisting on their 
rights, knowing that insistence on their rights could divert attention to duties 
they, as members of the communal society, strongly feel towards other 
members of the community.’40  
 
It is clear that, although Gyekye, in his characterisation, emphasizes the value 
of persons and gives reflection an active role, his position on the relationship between 
individual rights and communal duties is not different from that of Menkiti.  They 
both agree that individual rights are secondary to communal duties.  While this 
conclusion follows from Menkiti’s main notion of the ontological priority of the 
community, the conclusion when set against the background of Gyekye’s notions of 
the value of persons and the active use of reflection is more problematic.  These two 
notions are not compatible with the conclusion.  This is because. if as the active use of 
reflection entails, persons are free to choose, this freedom extends to situations where 
the need could arise to exercise reflective rejection against a non-acceptable 
communal duty.  However, Gyekye’s conclusion means that the exercise of the 
individual rights is only to the extent that it does not conflict with a communal duty.  
As a result of the value he places on persons, he distinguishes his form of 
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communitarianism from that of Menkiti.  He calls his own version a ‘restricted’ or 
‘moderate’ communitarianism.   
 
However, from the similarity of conclusions, it is not clear how moderate or 
restricted his form of communitarianism is.  With the similarity of the conclusions, 
Gyekye’s attempt at an amendment or refinement of Menkiti’s characterisation does 
not appear very strong.   Also, it is not clear whether a ‘restricted’ communitarianism 
entails a communitarian accommodation of liberalism or simply an attempt to stretch 
its principles to cover individual rights.  Gyekye is of the view that,  
 
...  communitarianism must realize that allowing free rein for the exercise of 
individual rights – which obviously includes the exercise of the unique 
qualities, talents and dispositions of the individuals – will enhance the cultural 
development and success of the community.41 (Italics emphasis supplied). 
 
He appears to be trying to ‘adjust’ communitarianism to fit with his notion of the 
active use of reflection.  However, these two notions are separate and are not 
compatible with each other.   
 
Generally, communitarianism implies the normative priority of the community 
over the person and his ends.  On the other hand, an active use of reflection implies 
the normative priority of persons over the community and its ends.  It is therefore 
possible to interpret Gyekye in two conflicting ways.  From his notion of the 
authoritative use of reflection, it can be said that persons can and should exercise their 
capacity for reflective rejection against an unacceptable communal duty.  This affirms 
their welfare as prior to that of the community.  However, in saying that communal 
duties are prior to individual rights, Gyekye’s conception fails to provide a significant 
status for individual rights – a position not so different from that of Menkiti.  Any 
improved status that appeared implied by virtue of his description of the active role of 
reflection defuses.  This is because it is contradicted by the conclusion he draws with 
relation to the primacy of communal duties over individual rights.  Taken together, 
the active role of reflection and the primacy of communal duties over individual rights 
entail a contradiction in Gyekye’s argument.   
 
In the next section, we are going to explore to what extent importing Kant’s 
concept of the categorical imperative into Gyekye’s notion of the active use of 
reflection can give individual rights a more significant status. 
 
 
Kant’s Kingdom of Ends 
 
Thus far, we have seen that in African thought it appears that individual rights 
take a secondary place to communal duties.  Although Gyekye, unlike Menkiti, 
emphasizes the value of persons, he does not arrive at a different position with 
relation to the relationship between individual rights and communal duties.  Persons 
are only valuable to the extent that they comply with the requirements of the 
community.  What Gyekye’s argument seems to amount to is merely an elaboration of 
Menkiti’s argument.  He gives content to it by showing how individual reflection 
functions in the scheme.  However, where reflection functions in the way he suggests, 
there arises a conflict with his conclusion on the priority of communal duties.  There 
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then arises the need to attempt at a resolution of this conflict to give individual rights 
a more significant status in African thought. 
 
Gyekye’s active use of reflection is a good place to start.  The question might 
arise why we need to accord a more significant status to individual rights.  The need 
arises from the fact that as Gyekye argues, some communal duties might be 
unacceptable and need revision.42  It is the role of individual members to revise these 
unacceptable duties which may be unappealing because they cause hardship to some 
or all of the members of the community.  They might also be regarded as 
unacceptable where they no longer represent the present socio-cultural realities of the 
community.  The active use of reflection provides the individual with a powerful tool 
for cultural change.  This use of reflection entails that he can reject communal duties 
that he does not find appealing and reasonable to do.  This notion of reflection, of 
course, has no place in Menkiti’s scheme.  This is because the ‘person-candidate’ 
cannot refuse to do the rituals and practices that form part of the process of 
incorporating him into the community.  In refusing to comply with these practices he 
fails to become a person.  Also, according to Menkiti’s account the person-candidate 
is not deemed to have this kind of moral capacity.  He only has the capacity to 
recognise and accept the authority of the community.  In using reflection actively, the 
person not only constructs his own values, he also reconstructs communal values.  By 
being able to reject communal duties that he does not find appealing, he is exercising 
his freedom – he is being autonomous.   
 
However, as we have seen autonomy does not mean a lawless freedom.  It 
means freedom according to moral law and for Kant that moral law is the categorical 
imperative which flows from the formula of universal law.  The categorical 
imperative is as follows: act only according to that maxim that you can will as a 
universal law.43  This means that in acting autonomously members of the community 
can only reject communal duties that cannot be willed as universal maxims.  
Conversely, they are bound to endorse laws that can be willed as universal maxims.   
The question then arises how we pass a communal duty through the formula of 
universal law.  We can do this by asking if the communal duty is something that can 
be successfully willed as a universal maxim.  Successful willing can mean three 
things.  It can mean that in being a universal maxim, it would not work against 
itself.44  It can also mean that in being a universal maxim, it would not be 
incompatible with other universal maxims.45  Lastly it can mean that in being a 
universal maxim, it would not work to destroy the normative order of which it is a 
part.46  An example that can illustrate these three meanings of successful willing is the 
universal maxim of not keeping promises.47  If not keeping promises was willed as a 
universal maxim, everyone would know that even if someone made a promise, they 
would not intend to keep it.  It would destroy the institution of promise-keeping and 
make the maxim irrelevant.  Also, such a maxim would be incompatible with another 
act that can be willed as a universal maxim which is the act of promise-keeping.  It is 
an act that if willed as a universal maxim would work towards the smooth running of 
the normative order.  Willing the opposite would not promote the normative order, 
(which to a large extent depends on the keeping of promises).   
 
The significance of universal willing for Gyekye’s active use of reflection is 
that it clarifies it.  It gives it a system and a method.  This is because where reflection 
with relation to communal duties has no method it becomes lawless, inconsistent and 
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ambiguous.  It can therefore be possible for two individual members of the 
community to reflectively reject and endorse a particular communal duty at the same 
time.  They would both be exercising Gyekye’s active use of reflection and be in 
conflict with each other.  However, the formula of universal law avoids this conflict 
by giving active reflection a method.  Thus, when faced with an unacceptable 
communal duty, a member can pass the duty through the formula of universal law.  
He can ask, ‘is it something that can successfully be willed as a universal maxim?’  If 
it can, then the member is bound by the law of his own autonomy to do it whether or 
not he feels like it.  If on the other hand it cannot be successfully willed as a universal 
maxim he is bound to reflectively reject it.  In endorsing it, he makes the universally 
‘will-able’ duty an autonomous duty and in rejecting it, he begins a revision of 
communal norms.   
 
Without the formula of universal law, Gyekye’s active use of reflection would 
entail a random disregard of communal values with no real commitment to 
constructive reform.  Members would reject what they like and only do what they 
accept when they feel like it.  The unrestricted use of reflection can bring about not 
only the destruction of the community but also the destruction of the member himself.  
This is because where he acts autonomously he constitutes himself as a moral agent.48  
The law of autonomy constitutes his agency.  Where he acts contrary to this he 
destroys himself.  Acting in accordance with the categorical imperative makes his 
actions consistent because they are guided by a moral law.49  However, if he acts 
lawlessly, he looses the internal coherence which gives rise to his identity as a rational 
person.  Thus, when the agent acts autonomously, he acts not only for the good of the 
community but also for the good of himself.  In constituting the community, he is 
constituting himself.  Self-constitution and communal constitution become one and 
the same activity.  When he acts, he at the same time constitutes himself and the 
community of which he is a part.  In this way, autonomous action can give rise to 
social change. 
 
However, Kant considers membership of a social community to be preceded 
by the agent’s membership of what he calls the Kingdom of Ends.  By the Kingdom, 
Kant means a “systematic union of various rational beings through common laws.”50  
The Kingdom of Ends is an aggregation of universal ends into a systematic whole 
after excluding personal inclinations and material ends by the operation of the 
Formula of Universal Law.  In the Kingdom, persons consider themselves and others 
as ends in themselves and not as means to ends.  There is thus a moral convergence 
that is achieved by the common objective laws.  The citizen of the Kingdom of Ends 
is a lawgiver to himself and not bound by the law of another.  He is free and 
autonomous.51  His autonomy is an expression of his freedom and for Kant, all 
rational persons desire freedom. 
 
There is however a distinction between a member of the Kingdom of Ends and 
a sovereign, one which Korsgaard does not make in her characterisation of practical 
identity.  The basic criterion to be part of the Kingdom of Ends is to act in accordance 
with universal laws.  To be a sovereign however, the agent must not only act 
according to universal laws, he must also not be subject to any other will apart from 
his own.  The member has a will that is not so good and so requires objective 
representations in form of categorical imperatives.  However, the sovereign has the 
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good will and so is not influenced by any subjective reasons that need to be controlled 
by a maxim.  This will requires obligation and its operation (which is duty).   
 
According to Kant, “a will whose maxims necessarily harmonise with the laws 
of autonomy is a holy, absolutely good will.”52  He therefore has no need for 
obligation and duty because the operation of his good will is always good.  Kant 
characterises morality as the process of conforming to the dynamics of how the 
Kingdom of Ends operates.  This dynamics is couched thus:  
 
to do no action on any other maxim than one such that it would be consistent 
with it to be a universal law, and hence to act only so that the will could regard 
itself as at the same time giving universal law through its maxim.53 
 
We are engaging in morality when the ‘relation of our actions to the autonomy of the 
will’ produces a universal by way of the maxims.  Where an action is in conformity 
with the autonomy of the will, it is moral and when it does not (that is, 
heteronomous), it is immoral.  The law of the Kingdom of Ends (that is, the 
categorical imperative) is therefore the law of the will.  To be a member of the 
Kingdom of Ends is to have your will act according to the formula of universal law.   
 
The problem with this notion, though it ascribes a certain universality to 
morality (where the agent is acting as part of a society of rational agents) it does not 
adequately account for the significance of community and communal membership.  
The notion of communal identity which as we see, is fundamental to both Menkiti’s 
and Gyekye’s account does not feature significantly in a Kantian scheme.  It rather 
creates a notional artificial construct (the Kingdom of Ends), from it ascribe an 
identity to the agent and therefrom derive the morality of action.  The consequent 
tension is that the person and not the community appears to be the source of identity 
in relation to normativity.  Thus, where importing the categorical imperative into 
Gyekye’s active use of reflection also imports a contradiction by virtue of the inherent 
individualist notion in the Kingdom of Ends, Kant cannot be taken to offer much by 
way of resolving the tensions in Gyekye’s characterisation.  In the next section we are 
going to look at how C. Korsgaard’s reinterprets Kant in such a way to address 
communal identity in relation to normativity. 
 
Korsgaard on Practical Identity 
 
Korsgaard’s premise is that as human beings we are not only normative, we 
are also reflective.  We are able to reflect on things, including our actions and 
ourselves.  Following this, we are therefore able to conceive ourselves in ways not 
unrelated to our actions.  For Korsgaard, the perception of deliberation is different 
when looked at from a different perspective.  In other words, though it may seem to 
me that you act according to your most compelling desire, in actual fact when you 
deliberate, it is as though there is a you above all your desires which chooses which 
desire to will as a law.  She argues that this you is a perceived self and according to 
Kant is not there to prove the existence of a metaphysical self.  It rather shows that 
this perceived self informs our choices of desire. 
 
For instance, with the Kikuyu tribe being part of the nation of Kenya, a 
Kenyan that is Kikuyu may perceive herself either as Kikuyu, as Kenyan or both.  
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According to Korsgaard, how you think of yourself will determine whether the willed 
law is the law of the Kingdom of Ends or the law of any other group.  Self-perception 
is characterised as fundamental to normativity.  The conception of identity relevant 
here is not the one in which others ordinarily perceive you but the one under which 
you value you yourself – who you believe you are.  Korsgaard calls this conception 
your practical identity.  According to her, this conception embraces other ‘identities’ 
like being a girl, a daughter, a friend, a student and so on.  These identities are 
normative in the sense that as Korsgaard says, “… [they] give rise to reasons and 
obligations.  Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring 
from what that identity forbids.”54  
 
The way we perceive ourselves gives rise to positive obligations.  Where we 
violate them, we lose a sense of who we are.  For Korsgaard, we are no longer able to 
think of ourselves in the way in which we value our humanity.  Kant describes this in 
terms of a sort of death.  Korsgaard seeks to argue that where going against our moral 
judgments does not have this kind of effect on us, it cannot be binding or motivating.  
The question arises what the practical identity should consist of.  Korsgaard begins by 
arguing that we are morally reflective beings and so we should be governed by some 
maxim.  This is since reflection alone is not sufficient to ground obligation following 
the arguments of externalists.  Even though upon reflection I think a particular action 
is good to do, that does not constitute a motivating and binding reason to do it. 
 
However, Korsgaard also argues that when we do not do what on reflection we 
have decided to do, we punish ourselves by guilt, regret, repentance and remorse.  
According to her, the acting self conceives of the reflecting self as the law-giver.  It is 
the concept of the law-giver that makes reflection authoritative.  The law-giver is the 
source of obligation.  The realist objection that there arises a need to further 
investigate the normativity of the law-giver becomes answered: we obey the law-giver 
because it is the authority of our own will.   
 
This does not deviate from a Kantian conception.  For Korsgaard, however, 
the introduction of practical identity not only gives acting a purpose but also is able to 
provide a structure that accommodates the communal identity that arises from being 
part of a Menkitian or Gyekyean community.  As part of my practical identity, I act to 
construct my communal identity.  It allows the agent to exercise reflective authority 
but with regards to the identity which as Korsgaard would argue, constitutes a way in 
which he values himself.  For Korsgaard, the method of self-constitution includes 
unifying and coordinating oneself in such a way that action represents a successful 
achievement internal constitution.   
 
To describe this dynamic (what she calls the ‘Constitutional model’) she uses 
constitution conceptions in Plato and Kant to show the role of action in the 
construction of identity.  She characterises Plato’s conception of justice and Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative as offering standards of action culminating in self-unification.  
Korsgaard uses these two accounts to give a metaphysical foundation for practical 
identity.  For Korsgaard, the method of the Categorical Imperative implies the 
Constitutional model.  She says, “inclination presents the proposal; reason decides 
whether to act on it or not, and the decision takes the form of a legislative act.”55  In 
this way, Platonic justice is compatible with the Categorical Imperative.   
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For Korsgaard, the similarity between the theories of Plato and Kant can be 
found in what they would consider to be tantamount to bad action.   For the 
Constitutional model good action is action that is consistent with the agent’s 
constitution.  However, following the Constitutional model, bad action does not exist 
because an unjust person cannot act at all.  However, Korsgaard argues that the unjust 
person may act but what appears to onlookers to be action is actually the product of a 
warring of his soul and not the product of deliberation.56  A bad action is therefore 
one which is unjust (for Plato) and not universalisable (for Kant).  With Plato we find 
the structure of the Constitutional model and with Kant, Korsgaard gives the 
substantive dynamics of the unification of the various parts.  In the Constitutional 
model we find a successful combination of the ethics of Plato and Kant.  Following 
the Constitutional model, action is therefore good when it works to the unification of 
the soul.  As bad action is symptomatic of a diseased soul, so also is good action 
beneficial to the soul.  Justice becomes therefore as Korsgaard says, “the condition of 
being able to maintain our unity as agents.”57  This description embodies the 
culmination of the Platonic and Kantian principles.  The Categorical Imperative helps 
us to be unified.  In acting from the Categorical Imperative, we constitute ourselves.  
The Categorical Imperative therefore becomes the internal normative standard for 
action.   
 
Thus, with Korsgaard’s characterisation the significance of the Categorical 
Imperative in Gyekye’s scheme is not only to guide action but also to constitute 
identity.  It is a conception that is able to incorporate the significant place that 
communal identity holds in African thought.  Even though Kant’s approach to duty 
gives the role of reflection in Gyekye’s characterisation a structure it does not 
accommodate the notion of communal identity.  With the concept of practical identity, 
it is able to do this as it is incorporated in the characterisation of identity, the notion of 
the ‘binding-ness’ of action.  In other words, it not only explains the structure of 
identity but also how this structure can make certain actions binding for the person.  
Action is at once linked to identity and to agency.  Through action, persons construct 
their identity and in doing so, the identity of the community.  Where action is 
understood as a tool for the constitution of identity, its obligatoriness becomes clearer.  
It is then easier to understand when Menkiti says that becoming a person is something 
to be achieved as one complies with communal directives.   
 
This is because where the achievement of personhood is linked to compliance 
with the practices of the community, the notion of necessitation that is at the basis of 
obligation,58 is imported into the characterisation of personhood.  Also imported is the 
notion of the public nature of personhood.  Being a person is not then a personal 
thing.  It is a public experience.  Its publicity is not only derived from the fact that the 
communal directives are a significant part of its characterisation but also that the 
nature of the practices makes it that personhood is a shared experience.  Many of the 
practices carried out are done in collaboration with other members of the community.  
In being mostly collaborative, the rituals that make up, as it were, the ‘steps to 
personhood’, reinforce the public nature of personhood.  To be a person is therefore to 
be publicly a person.  Private personhood is incompatible with African thought on the 
nature of personhood.          
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Resolving the Crisis of Personhood in African Philosophy 
 
Worth looking at is how the above resolution would work with relation to an 
actual scenario involving a required communal duty that is for some reason 
unacceptable.  An example of such a scenario is the customary duties required of 
widows.  These are mostly communal duties attached to the period of mourning that 
the widow is obligated to go through in the event of the death of her husband.  Some 
of these practices are objectionable.  They are, as Gyekye would say, “inelegant, 
undignifying” and “unenlightening”.59  The practices sometimes include physical and 
psychological abuse.  According to Sossou, “widowhood practice throughout West 
Africa is a period of hardship and deprivation.  It includes varying degrees of physical 
seclusion and a state of ritual contamination or impurity calling for purification.”60  
The practices can be said to represent how the cultures conceptualise death.61  Some 
cultures believe that death contaminates the widow and that she must be purified.62  
The practices in a way represent the metaphysical beliefs of the community.  They 
mirror the ways in which the community interprets death and its significance for 
persons.  These practices can entail different acts like sleeping in the graveyard,63 
drinking water that has been used to cleanse the corpse,64 forced crying at specified 
times of the day for days,65 shaving of body hair,66 forced nudity,67 controlled 
physical appearance,68 physical and social seclusion,69 disinheritance70 and so on.  
They can be seen as requirements that constitute the duties that the widow owes the 
dead spouse and the community in general.   
 
However, these duties are unacceptable because they cause hardship to the 
widow.  Though she is bound by custom to do them, they do not contribute to her own 
well being.  They also do not represent her as an autonomous being in the sense of 
being an end in herself and not a means to an end.  We find this sense of autonomy in 
Kant’s formula of humanity which is as follows: “so act that you use humanity, 
whether in you own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as 
an end, never merely as a means.”71  This is a parameter for evaluating actions.  If the 
act represents you as an end in yourself and as a means to an end then in doing that 
act, you are acting autonomously.   
 
The common sense derivation of this notion is that no one likes to feel used.72  
In this way, the formula of humanity is a principle of value.  This is because to treat 
someone as an end in herself and not simply as a means to another end is to value her 
humanity.  The duties as we can see do not ascribe value to her as an end in herself – 
as an autonomous being.  Where an attempt is made to will any of the above listed 
widowhood practices as a universal, three possible meanings of successful willing 
arise - that in being a universal maxim, the act would not work against itself; be 
incompatible with other maxims; or work to destroy the normative order of which it is 
a part.  If any of the practices were universally willed it would work against itself.  
This is because instead of being what it is intended to be - a time when the 
community’s beliefs about death are expressed and celebrated, it would merely be a 
time of suffering for the widow and those close to her.  Also, willing these practices 
as universal laws would give rise to conflicts with other maxims.   
 
Universal maxims that can be willed according to the formula of universality 
are supposed to be consistent with each other.  An example of a universal maxim that 
would conflict with the maxim of the performance of unacceptable communal duties 
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of widows is the maxim that the well being of persons should be preserved.  It can be 
called a maxim of human welfare.  Without this maxim, it would be the moral law and 
not the exception to cause suffering to persons.  Also, one would be justified in not for 
instance, helping a drowning man.  Therefore, because the act of preserving the well 
being of others can be successfully willed as a universal maxim and it conflicts with 
the universal willing of the performance of unacceptable communal duties of widows, 
the latter maxim cannot be successfully willed. 
 
In addition, willing the performance of these duties as a universal maxim 
would not work to the preservation of the moral order.  This is because the moral 
order depends on the autonomy of its agents for its existence.  Where persons are not 
free or are ‘partially’ autonomous there would be inequality among persons.  
Inequality gives rise to exploitation and domination by the upper class of persons.  
Whereas political orders can thrive on inequality, moral orders are constituted by 
equal and autonomous persons. That is the foundation of the moral order. Therefore, 
if something is a moral law, it is a moral law for every body.  Agents in the moral 
order are ends in themselves.  Thus, if an act de-values an agent, it is not something 
that he or any other person should do.  This is because to act in this way would be to 
destroy the foundation of universal value on which the moral order is based.  This is 
why an act that de-values the agent cannot be willed as a universal maxim.  This is 
because it is something that would de-value everybody and destroy the moral order.  
Thus, if it is something that de-values everybody, it is not something that he should 
do.  Moral orders are based on this universal or equal value.  This means that anything 
that is good for you should be good for me and vice versa.   
 
In failing the three tests of the formula of universality, it can be said that the 
performance of unacceptable communal duties of widows cannot be willed as a 
universal maxim.  It is not something that Gyekye’s autonomous persons when using 
reflection actively should do.  However, this argument has not sufficiently 
acknowledged the concept of communal identity which is at the foundation of African 
thought.  Where the widow, for instance, does not comply with a communal practice, 
is not the construction of her communal identity at stake?  As we saw, Korsgaard’s 
response to this tension would be to conceptualize communal identity as practical 
identity and consider it as constructed where the agent acts in compliance with the 
formula of universal law.  In other words, by characterising communal identity as a 
practical identity, she does not lose her communal identity by not complying with an 
unacceptable communal duty.  She is in fact unifying with herself with her 
community.  Communal identification is therefore not incompatible with non-
compliance with communal directives.  This helps clarify any tensions in African 
thought on the normative relationship between the person and the community by 
giving individual rights a more significant status and giving the active use of 
reflection in Gyekye’s scheme, a method – the categorical imperative.   
 
This method not only makes for consistency and certainty of moral 
deliberation in relation to communal values, it also resolves the contradiction in 
favour of individual rights.  This is because Gyekye’s autonomous person is not 
morally bound to perform a communal duty that cannot be willed as a universal 
maxim.  The significance of this for personhood in African thought is that it signals a 
movement from a communitarian conception to a more liberalist conception.  This 
does not mean that the significance of the community is downplayed for as Gyekye 
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argues the community benefits from the exercise of reflective ability by its 
members.73  According to him, “the conceptions [of the person] are articulated in the 
critical analyses and arguments of its intellectuals.”74  Reflective activity is 
fundamental to the development and continued existence of the community.  In 
reflecting, we create new cultures and communal values become dynamic not static.  
However, from the example of the universal willing of unacceptable communal duties 
of widows, we saw that the reflective exercise is done by the agent possessing the 
duty.  Autonomous reflection is a first-person sort of reflection.  It is done by the 
agent himself and not another for him.  Thus, though reflective activity can be done 
by ‘intellectuals’, the kind of reflective activity needed for socio-cultural reform is a 
first-person reflection.  It is reflection by the person who possesses the unacceptable 
communal duty.   
 
We can see this in Gyekye’s description of the active use of reflection.  The 
agent himself must find the duties “inelegant, undignifying or unenlightening”.75  
Thus, the active use of reflection places a moral responsibility on persons to begin the 
change.  This responsibility though an enormous one, is necessary if communal values 
are to develop.  Autonomy places on persons, a responsibility to ensure the 
development and continued existence of their communities.  
 
What is the significance of the relationship between the personhood discourse 
and globalisation?  An important aspect of Africa’s relationship with the world is the 
African’s relationship with the world.  The tensions that were noticeable in the 
characterisations of Menkiti and Gyekye are not tensions that emanate solely from the 
formulations but from the changing conceptions of the African person as a rights-
holder that have occurred as a result of cultural influences from the west.  There has 
emerged caution about according to a political structure like the community absolute 
normative authority with relation to persons.  The notion of individual rights is a 
mechanism that tries to represent this caution by allowing persons to challenge the 
community thereby diluting any conception of absolute moral authority.   
 
This represents a more normative aspect of the effect of a globalizing world.  
Globalisation can be seen as completing a revolution in the normative conception of 
the person in African thought, the seeds of which were sown during colonisation.  
This revolution has seen not only a change in the dynamics of personhood but also in 
the structure of the community.  In the African context any change in the conception 
of the person effects a change in the structure of the community in relation to persons.  
The more central the position of individual rights, the less absolute the influence of 
the community would be but as we have argued this does not mean a threat to the role 
of the community.  The community can only continue to develop if people play a 
significant role in socio-cultural reform.  Thus, even though it can appear that the 
exercise of individual rights would signal the destruction of the community, it actually 
makes for the constant re-birth and growth of the community.  Not paying adequate 
attention to individual rights in African thought creates other less easily resolvable 
problems.   
 
The reception of foreign laws during colonisation brought with it aspects of 
the more individualist culture existent in the western worldview.  This inevitably 
creates a conflict with the indigenous culture and there emerges two major normative 
orders – that of the received law and that of the indigenous culture.  At the basis of 
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this conflict is the difficulty of reconciling liberalist and communitarian conceptions 
of the person and the role of the community with relation to this.  However, with the 
introduction of certain robust concepts as we did with Kant’s categorical imperative 
and Korsgaard’s practical identity, there is an increased possibility to resolve any 
tensions that arise.  Some have argued that the challenge that globalisation presents to 
us as philosophers is the need for a general jurisprudence; one that will represent an 
aggregation of various legal cultures that arise from different societies.76  However, 
the possibility of this arising in the absence of a dialogue between these cultures is 
grim.  This dialogue needs to be on an equal platform not on one where one culture 
assumes a hegemonic dominance over others.  It is only in the event of such a 
dialogue that concepts can arise which will form the basis of any general 
jurisprudence.   
 
One of the prerequisites for such a dialogue however is the resolution of issues 
of identity.  This is particularly relevant in the African context where arriving at a 
coherent sense of identity has not been a very easy enterprise.  This paper aims to be 
part of that project of getting to better understand ourselves.  Understanding what our 
conceptions of what it means to be a person is central to any project of cultural 
identity.  As we can see, the tensions that appear to arise in the normative conception 
of the person in African thought represent the effect of colonisation on traditional 
African culture and attempts to resolve these tensions represent attempts to 
reconstruct our identity after what Wiredu calls the ‘accident’ of colonisation.77  
Though a task such as this is an overwhelming one and cannot be completed in a 
hurry, it signals a step towards the dialogue that is necessary to arrive at a less 
western-particularist jurisprudence.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The relationship between the person and the community in African traditional 
thought is one that is representative of what is distinctive about African thinking.  Our 
investigation has sought to uncover certain tensions in the formulations of key 
thinkers in this regard, Menkiti and Gyekye, with the aim of attempting at a resolution 
by taking recourse to some concepts in Kantian and Korsgaardian ethics.  We also 
show how this relates to arriving at a general jurisprudence that represents all legal 
cultures.  Though we are sceptical about the possibility of such a jurisprudence, we 
argue that a dialogue of legal cultures is necessary if any such endeavour is to be a 
reality. 
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